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Is democracy compatible with (advanced) capitalism?
And how has (advanced) democracy maintained
resilience? In Democracy and Prosperity: Reinventing
Capitalism through a Turbulent Century, Torben
Iversen and David Soskice, two prominent scholars of
comparative political economy, take up the challenge to
contribute to the debate concerning the relationship
between democracy and capitalism with a unique and
provocative analytical framework. It should be stated at
the very beginning that this review cannot do full justice
to every noteworthy point raised in this significant
contribution given the space limitation. This is because
the book offers an extended view of the relationship
between democracy and capitalism over a long period of
time, aiming to enable us to understand the drivers of
the middle income trap, how democratic politics
strengthen capitalism, how capitalism and democracy have risen in tandem, why we
observe varieties of capitalism across advanced capitalist democracies and the rise of
inequality without redistribution.
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A multi-tiered, multi-factorial historical comparative analysis of the relationship
between capitalism and democracy provides a thick description of democracy driving
capitalism in the twentieth-century Fordist economy and the twenty-first-century
knowledge economy. The main argument asserts, firstly, that both during the Fordist
era and for the construction of the knowledge economy, democracy has been the main
driver of capitalism. For this to happen, the state has played a central role in investing
in education, (re)skilling, (re)training and enforcing rules for a solid playing field that
enables firms to flourish.
Secondly, capital is geographically bounded because capitalism (both Fordist and post-
Fordist) needs co-located labour with co-specific skills that rely on social networks. As
such networks constitute skill clusters, capital cannot move freely since it is chasing
labour and skills. Thirdly, the electorate look for politicians known as ‘good economic
managers’ who can manage labour (read this as pacifying unions to limit ‘militant 
behaviour’) and implement policies that contribute to ensure the success of capitalism
by expanding educational, financial and economic opportunities, mainly through
neoliberal policies. Together, these key elements constitute a symbiotic, two-way
relationship between democracy and capitalism.
Here, the demands of the middle class, which are mediated through either majoritarian
or proportional electoral systems, are the key to understanding how democracy
reinforces capitalism and how capitalist economies have remained resilient
democratically. More specifically and related to the emergence of the knowledge
economy, as capitalist democracies have advanced, the preferences of the middle class
have evolved towards favouring more liberalisation and financialisation among other
processes. Motivated by a political survival logic which dictates that they must be
reputed as ‘good economic managers’, politicians have responded to the demands of the
middle class to liberalise economies, which has facilitated the emergence of the
knowledge economy. Here, it is useful to note that the authors build the theoretical and
analytical framework upon the ‘middle class’ and its political-economic preferences
which have a central role in explaining how political economies evolve and which
policies are more likely to be pursued (11-14).
This transformation has naturally created a group of ‘losers’ (the ‘old middle class’ that
is stuck in low-paying jobs with low productivity) that has observed erosion in their
socio-economic rights, as well as ‘winners’ (the ‘new middle class’) that have benefited
most from globalisation, liberalisation and the rise of the knowledge economy which
requires sophisticated skills. Positioned in a dense social network in big cities where
skill clusters attract and preserve capital, the ‘new middle class’ has a totally different
set of preferences, which creates a gap between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ middle classes.
The authors argue that democracy is not about equality or redistribution, but about
furthering the relative position of the middle classes. As such, the ‘new middle class’
only cares about its own welfare, and its members are not concerned about the
compensation of the ‘losers’. In this regard, interests diverge, and the ‘losers’ start to
feel the ‘tunnel effect’, which is based on overly optimistic ‘imagined futures’ of social
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mobility and greater equality. Consequently, when the ‘tunnel effect’ becomes a fiction
that fails to materialise greater equality through social mobility, we observe the ‘losers’
voting for populists. The authors maintain that the rise of populism is not a cultural
phenomenon, but is the very product of socio-economic and political phenomena that
have their origins in how the knowledge economy and its political-economic bases have
failed to compensate the ‘losers’.
While the book presents a rich historical and contemporary analysis of the relationship
between democracy and capitalism, the main arguments are not immune from
weaknesses. Firstly, the authors argue that we observe the rise as well as the persistence
of neoliberalism because the electorate vote for politicians known as ‘good economic
managers’ who are devoted to expanding socio-economic opportunities mainly through
liberalisation: in other words, market deregulation. Such a justification reads like a
plausible argument, but the authors fail to acknowledge the causal role played by
neoliberalism in the puzzle of increased inequality without redistribution and its impact
on the rise of populism given liberalisation, privatisation and the transformation from
the welfare state to the regulatory state.
Further, the authors claim that the new middle class favours financialisation because it
enables ‘‘‘non-linear’’ careers with more frequent changes in jobs, house purchases,
flexible mortgages and savings, time off for retaining and additional schooling and
moves back and forth between work and family’ (151). The argument reads like a
euphemism for the dominance of finance in economic and cultural life, and the
structural change that has caused a dramatic decline in labour share in income and the
rise in household indebtedness. In this regard, a high debt burden can hardly be driven
by what I might call a ‘liquid lifestyle’. It is the product of a structural change and what
it imposes on us. The authors tend to overlook such structural transformation and its
costly consequences.
Secondly, Democracy and Prosperity considers that education and training have a
central role both in democratic resilience and welfare since it is a key asset for social
mobility. Iversen and Soskice therefore have a recommendation: ‘the real solution’ for
the resilience of capitalist democracies against the populist backlash and to boost social
welfare is improvements in access to and an increase in investment in education and
(re)training (243). Yet, this is not a panacea, especially in a world where ‘the son also
rises’ and entrance to elite universities (where students have access to better education
as well as ‘high-powered social networks’) can be a corrupt system. Under these
circumstances, improving access to and/or investing more in education cannot solve all
the problems and needs of advanced capitalist democracies. More is needed.
Thirdly, the authors argue that skill and education systems that facilitate ‘equal
distribution of income and inter- and intra-generational mobility’, company-specific
skills and skill upgrading that reduces mass unemployment and cities as hubs for co-
specific assets and social networks together limit the spread of populist parties and
values (218). Moreover, it is not in the interest of the new middle class to vote for
populists because ‘intolerance [to immigration, a cosmopolitan outlook] and
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conformism is not conducive to economic success in the knowledge economy’ (217).
Since the new middle class has a stake in the success of the knowledge economy for its
own welfare, capitalist democracies remain resilient to the populist backlash. Yet, this
expectation is implicitly based on the understanding that interests would trump ideas
that are cultivated socially, and that skill and education systems are capable of creating
equal or fairer income distribution and the conditions for inter- and intra-generational
mobility. Perhaps more importantly, there would always be ‘good economic managers’
that have a cosmopolitan outlook, are tolerant of immigrants and are devoted to
improving socio-economic opportunities. If the above conditions are not met, the
current political-economic system might not be able to withstand the populist backlash,
as the new middle class may be socialised into populist ideas and join the old middle
class to vote for populist leaders.
All in all, Iversen and Soskice present a unique analysis of the relationship between
capitalism and democracy. Whether or not one is convinced by the argument,
Democracy and Prosperity is a great addition to the recent debate on the ‘crisis of
democratic capitalism’ (see also Buying Time by Wolfgang Streeck, Democratic
Capitalism at the Crossroads by Carles Boix and Cultural Backlash by Pippa Norris
and Ronald Inglehart, among many others). The book offers a brilliant framework that
will be greatly acknowledged as well as critiqued in the coming years.
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